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Abstract 
Based on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) work in developing a standard 
for models and simulations (M&S), the subject of credibility in M&S became a distinct focus. This is an 
indirect result from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), which eventually 
resulted in an action, among others, to improve the rigor in NASA's M&S practices. The focus of this 
action came to mean a standardized method for assessing and reporting results from any type of M&S. As 
is typical in the standards development process, this necessarily developed into defming a common 
terminology base, common documentation requirements (especially for M&S used in critical decision 
making), and a method for assessing the credibility of M&S results. What surfaced in the development of 
the NASA Standard was the various dimensions credibility to consider when accepting the results from any 
model or simulation analysis. The eight generally relevant factors of credibility chosen in the NASA 
Standard proved only one aspect in the dimensionality of M&S credibility. At the next level of detail, the 
full comprehension of some of the factors requires an understanding along a couple of dimensions as well. 
Included in this discussion are the prerequisites for the appropriate use of a given M&S, the choice of 
factors in credibility assessment with their inherent dimensionality, and minimum requirements for fully 
reporting M&S results.
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Abstract 
Based on the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration's (NASA's) work in developing a standard 
for models and simulations (M&S), the subject of credibility 
in M&S became a distinct focus. This is an indirect result 
from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board (CAIB), which eventually resulted in an action, 
among others, to improve the rigor in NASA's M&S 
practices. The focus of this action came to mean a 
standardized method for assessing and reporting results 
from any type of M&S. As is typical in the standards 
development process, this necessarily developed into 
defining a common terminology base, common 
documentation requirements (especially for M&S used in 
critical decision making), and a method for assessing the 
credibility of M&S results. What surfaced in the 
development of the NASA Standard was the various 
dimensions credibility to consider when accepting the 
results from any model or simulation analysis. The eight 
generally relevant factors of credibility chosen in the NASA 
Standard proved only one aspect in the dimensionality of 
M&S credibility. At the next level of detail, the fill 
comprehension of some of the factors requires an 
understanding along a couple of dimensions as well. 
Included in this discussion are the prerequisites for the 
appropriate use of a given M&S, the choice of factors in 
credibility assessment with their inherent dimensionality, 
and minimum requirements for fully reporting M&S results. 
1.	 Introduction 
Credibility in models and simulations (M&S) is a complex 
topic and spans the range of understanding from the purely 
quantitative to the essentially qualitative, while touching the 
scientific and engineering practitioner/specialist as well as 
decision makers at the highest management level. This 
breadth of exposure, along these two linked dimensions 
alone (quantitative-qualitative, specialist-management), 
induces a level of complexity in the topic. This topic of 
credibility in M&S is a, more or less, direct outgrowth of the 
development of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Standard for Models and 
Simulations [M&S Standard], hereafter referred to as 'the 
Standard.' It is also the most contentious topic. 
The origin of the NASA Standard stems from the Space 
Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 
[CAm]. While the recommendations from that board are 
Shuttle Program centric, the subsequent review lead by Diaz 
[Diaz] looked at the CAIB findings and detailed 
intiatives/actions applicable across all of NASA. Action 4 
called for the development of "a standard for the 
development, documentation, and operation of models and 
simulations" {Diaz]. Along with that action, the NASA 
Office of the Chief Engineer (OCE) directed the inclusion of 
"a standard method to assess the credibility of the M&S 
presented to the decision maker" [OCE letter]. The 
resulting development of the Standard started in April 2005, 
went through three iterations of development, and 
culminated in the proposed final version for NASA-wide 
concurrence in early 2008. Bertch (et al.) describe the 
development process of the Standard and the included 
Credibility Assessment Scale (CAS), along with some key 
lessons learned from that effort [SISO 08]. 
The topics in the literature most closely related to credibility 
revolve around V&V. While this is indeed central to 
credibility, it does not adequately cover the full scope of the 
topic. In the forthcoming discussion (we'll see that), 
achieving credibility in M&S results requires more than 
verification and validation (V&V) of the M&S. 
An added level of difficulty in developing and obtaining 
concurrence with this credibility assessment is that, by 
intent and design, it must apply to all types of M&S and all 
phases of the M&S process. While difficult, this broad 
applicability is the exact purpose for pursuing the path of a 
standard, rather than a recommended practice or handbook. 
Some additional background on the justification for a 
standard development is in the following background 
section. 
2. Background 
Standards come in a variety of fashions and purposes, and 
are levied by organizations, the market, professional
Table z 
Software M&S ___________ 
Activity Perform a task Representing (the 
within a system behavior of) a system 
Purpose Performance of Analysis & 
tasks/functions for Understanding of a 
a system system for insight or 
behavioral mimicking 
of a system for 
_____________ ________________
training/gaming 
Requirements Discrete functions Behaviors the 
to perform simulation model to 
exhibit 
______________ 
Assumptions
_________________ 
Typically, none Always 
& 
Abstractions ________________ ___________________ 
Uncertainty Typically, none Almost always
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portion of M&S are implemented in software, there are also 
some significant differences, which stem from their 
respective definitions. Generally, software is a program or 
code that allows a computer to perform a specific task, 
whereas a model or simulation is (possibly a computer 
program designed to mimic or imitate) an abstract 
representation/representation of the characteristics of a 
system. The difference between task performance and 
behavior mimicking is significant enough to consider a new 
standard. A comparison of software and M&S is shown in 
Table z. While software standards typically do not consider 
use of the software, an M&S standard must include the use 
as that is crucial in producing credible results.
verification, validation, quality, rigor, and maturity surfaced 
to supplant it. While these concepts are valuable and even 
central to credibility, none of them sufficiently encompass 
the concept that leads to acting on the results from an M&S. 
The NASA Standard defines credibility as the quality to 
elicit belief or trust in M&S results. 
A prescriptive approach to credibility across the broad 
spectrum of M&S is probably not possible, as each M&S 
type may approach the topic differently. This does not 
mean that some commonality in the discussion cannot 
occur. One instance of commonality is that all M&S should 
do some form of V&V. M&S literature contains much 
about V&V with the process traditionally represented as in 
Figure b [Sargent] [SCS]. 
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While developing some semblance of a credibility scale for 
one or two phases of the modeling and simulation cycle 
(e.g., V&V) or for one specific type of M&S can more 
adequately represent that particular segment or paradigm, it 
would not solve the problem of clearly and consistently 
communicating with management level decision makers. 
This is specifically why the development of a standard 
(though high level) methodology for M&S, and the 
reporting of results from M&S, is needed. It provides a 
common framework and terminology base across and 
between disciplines that makes communication more clear 
and consistent. This whole issue of clarity in the 
communication of technical data is central to the works of 
Edward Tufte, who provided such assessments to both the 
Challenger and Columbia investigations [Tufte]. This 
Standard provides at least the basis for necessary clarity and 
completeness in communication in the practice of and 
presentation of results from modeling and simulation. 
3. Credibility 
The specific term 'credibility' was not chosen quickly or 
without debate. Conceptually related terms, such as
Verification
Figure b - Simplified Model of V&V ©Sargent & SCS 
While the conceptual model (CM) in the traditional sense 
represents what is included in the system model, this is 
typically just the first step, which rarely includes enough 
information for detailed for implementation. Typically, 
once the CM is set, additional details are required to ensure 
the model has adequate representational fidelity to meet the 
requirements for the intended analyses with the model. This 
can include an additional level of detail from the initial CM, 
some 'business logic' required for the model to run or 
collect data as required for systems analysis, or detailed 
specification of the (computational) mathematics involved 
in a specific type of analysis. In the diagram of Figure c, 
this additional level of model specification is shown in the 
inserted step after the CM, termed the Implementable CM 
(1CM). The 1CM is created from further understanding of 
the essential details of both the CM and the real-world 
system, and is thus validated by comparison to both. While 
the general CM concept includes this additional detail, many 
analysts add this step in practice prior to actual model 
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data is important. The real-world environment (RWE) 
analogy is shown as the vertical axis on the left of Figure c, 
showing improvement in quality while moving up the axis. 
Both axes, though notional, depict a spectrum of 
possibilities, with full credibility achieved when an exactly 
matching referent system resides in the exact environment 
of the operational target system for the M&S analysis. 
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The factors in the M&S Operations category relate to how a 
M&S is used for a specific analysis. Two things affect the 
level of uncertainty in the results of a M&S: the input and 
the methods in the computational system. Confidence in the 
M&S input more or less defines its pedigree, and is a 
product of the source of the data, the quality and quantity of 
the data used as the basis for M&S input, and the form of 
the M&S input. The input to a M&S can range from the 
purely notional to the rigorously derived stochastic, with the 
source playing a crucial part. With little or no real 
understanding of a given input, notional values can easily 
find their way into a M&S. Subject matter experts (SME5) 
can lend credibility to input values from known point values 
(e.g., averages) to ranges of values (taking the form of 
uniform and triangular distributions). Beyond that, it is 
necessary to obtain real data from referent systems, and the 
more data that is available, the better the possibility of 
having fully representational input to the M&S. The quality 
of the input thus depends on the source and quantity of 
referent data. This is not the final word on input pedigree, 
however. What is done with this source data to transform it 
into the best form of M&S input is also key to improving 
results credibility. Even with lots of data in hand, it is 
readily reducible to any of several deterministic values (e.g., 
minimum, average, maximum). While running these values 
is certainly instructive, it by no means is a solution unto 
itself. Depending on the type of M&S and the specific input 
under consideration, either iteratively running the M&S with
several values for the variables or a stochastic run is 
possible. This is where the form of the input becomes 
relevant. Deterministic runs are relatively simple to perform 
and analyze, while stochastic runs, with probability 
distribution functions as input, require more preparation on 
the front end and more analysis on the back end. 
The uncertainty in results from M&S is potentially one of 
the most esoteric subjects in M&S, possibly because each 
M&S type includes or discusses it in such varied ways. It 
almost goes without saying that uncertainty is one of the key 
factors in M&S credibility and is directly related to the risk 
in accepting the results from an M&S analysis. Aleatory 
uncertainty, considered as some form of inherent or 
stochastic uncertainty, and epistemic uncertainty, considered 
either as lack of or incomplete knowledge of the system 
modeled, are becoming clear distinctions in the risk 
assessment community [Oberkamf, et al. - Challenge 
Problems]. As such, it's possible to consider the chosen 
assumptions or abstractions by the modeler as sources of 
epistemic uncertainty. Given these sources of uncertainty, 
there are two qualities of an uncertainty estimate that are 
manifest in M&S results: the size and the confidence. For a 
developed model and its myriad of inputs, the output from 
the simulation run has a level of uncertainty associated with 
it. The acceptability of that size is dependent on the system 
modeled and the intended purpose of the analysis. Along 
with that, however, is the confidence inherent in the 
computational uncertainty. Figure d shows combinations of 
these two aspects of uncertainty with cautions in their 
combination.
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specific type of M&S, and the experience with and 
understanding of the modeled system of these people play a 
part in assessing the credibility of the M&S results. 
Five of the eight factors in the CAS of the NASA M&S 
Standard include a required technical review sub-factor, 
which assesses the level of peer review successfully 
completed relevant to the parent factor. The idea is that a 
M&S (and/or modeling and simulation process) that is 
successfully peer-reviewed is more credible than one that is 
not. The level of independence, the qualifications of the 
members, and the level of formality of the peer-review 
group can also lend credibility to a particular M&S result. 
The formality of the review refers to conduct in accordance 
with rules explicitly established by the reviewed or 
reviewing organization. 
4.	 Discussion 
While many of the concepts for these credibility factors are 
general in nature, they provide a context for discussing 
critical aspects of M&S results, applicable to all types of 
M&S. Much in the literature is written on V&V, especially 
as applicable to a particular M&S discipline, or even more 
specifically one particular M&S discipline as applied to a 
particular study area. While firmly based on traditional 
V&V, the discussion of credibility is also more than that. In 
the approach developed by the NASA M&S Standard TWG, 
six additional factors contribute to a credibility assessment 
beyond V&V. 
One prime purpose for the development of this standard is to 
not permit the presentation of just M&S results, since, in 
and of itself, a set of results is not a complete picture. To 
that end, the requirements in Section 8 of the Standard spell 
out the distinct reporting requirements for presenting M&S 
results for critical decision making. For NASA's purpose, a 
critical decision is one that impacts human safety or project-
defined mission success criteria [NASA Standard]. Thus, 
the general reporting requirements when presenting M&S 
results are: 
• An unfavorable use assessment of the M&S for the 
particular analysis 
• The best estimate of the results 
• A statement on the uncertainty in the results 
• The evaluation of the results using the credibility 
assessment scale 
• Any explicit caveats that accompany the results 
(e.g., errors or warnings occurring during a 
simulation run) 
As most of these requirements are self-explanatory or 
already discussed, use assessment needs a little explanation. 
The concept here is to ensure the use of the M&S is within 
the known bounds of its verified and validated operation. 
The development of a M&S typically allow a wide range of
inputs and tuning parameters, but only a smaller portion of 
the allowable domain is rigorously examined and accepted. 
When making critical decisions with M&S, the intent is to 
ensure the use of the M&S is within its verified and 
validated bounds. 
In the final approval process for this Standard, there was a 
fair amount of objections raised to it, especially with respect 
to the CAS. Upon consideration, this is not dissimilar to the 
objections raised when the first software standards were in 
development. Table 1 lists the primary objections with 
rebuttal comments. 
Objection Rebuttal 
Not right for a TWG was comprised of practitioners of 
particular M&S a variety of M&S methods and problem 
type domains 
Assessments are Subjectivity is a part of all M&S, and 
subjective also of decision making - the purpose 
of the CAS is to provide information to 
a decision maker to enhance their 
_______________ decision making 
CAS is too M&S is complex, which is precisely 
complex why a standardized approach to M&S 
development, operations, results 
_____________ reporting is needed 
Already have There are many similarities, but the 
software focus of software and M&S is different 
standards__________________________________
In short, software performs tasks within a system, whereas, 
M&S mimic the behavior of a system. Even though M&S 
are often computer/software-based implementations, the 
distinction between performing a task and mimicking a 
behavior is key. Software standards address functions that 
are static and deterministic, that is, without uncertainty. 
Purely analytical models with deterministic inputs and 
outputs can also be included here. In simulations, however, 
the inclusion of dynamic and stochastic behaviors 
introduces uncertainty into the functioning of the system. 
Law and Kelton [3fh ed.] originally published a somewhat 
simpler version of Figure IV-a, which is augmented here 
with additional characteristics of various M&S types. 
Further experiential aspects of M&S are also included with 
the addition of visualization and other sensory components 
to enhance the immersive aspects of the simulated system. 
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